Publications - 2014

Ambiguity in Performance Pay: An Online Experiment

Many incentive plans are inherently ambiguous, lacking an explicit mapping between performance and compensation. Using an online labor market, Amazon Mechanical Turk, we study the effect of ambiguity on willingness to accept contracts to do a real-effort task as well as completion and performance of this task. Ambiguity about the relationship between performance and compensation affects the willingness of individuals to accept contracts and the likelihood of quitting before completion, but not performance. These effects are non-monotonic in the level of ambiguity. Information about ability at the task reduces willingness to accept and increases quitting, but does not affect performance.

An Empirical Model of Tax Convexity and Self-Employment

A Structural Model of Tax Progressivity and Self-Employment

Capital Budgeting and Fiscal Sustainability in British Columbia

Capital Input Decisions under Rate of Return Regulation

Information Effect Regarding Inequality of Opportunities on Redistribution: A Lab Experiment

Resilience of River Basin Governance Institutions in the Saskatchewan River Basin of Western Canada (Chapter 6 in)

"Shocks" and Productivity

Are productivity increases from small amounts of stress (or shocks) in an economic task dependent upon the content of the shock? It has been found small amounts of stress can lead to an increase in memory. We examine if the same is true with productivity in an economic experiment and whether it depends on the content of the stress. In our first experiment we suddenly expose participants to a "scary" or "cute" image during a real-effort task. We observe significant productivity gains after subjects view the scary image only. Our second experiment tests whether it was the method by which the image was presented or the image itself that lead to productivity gains. Results suggest productivity gains in the workplace depend on the shock itself and how the content is viewed by employees.

The effect of financial goals and incentives on labor. An experimental test in an online market.

Empirical studies investigating work motivation over time find people with fluctuating wages work more on days when their wage rate is lower compared to when wages are higher. The authors of these studies theorize individuals use daily income goals and stop working once they reach their goal. This study involves assignment and manipulation of financial goals in an online labor market that is nearly frictionless. Workers can quit at any time and can start jobs posted by competing employers almost instantly. Results, with pooled data, indicate financial goals do not lead to workers stopping work once they reached their goals and there is no significant wage related crowding out. However, when we separate the sample by western and non-western workers, we find production by western workers is greatest in treatments with goals and low incentives. This effect is absent in non-western workers.

The Endogeneity Problem in Applied Fisheries Econometrics: A Critical Review

The Impact of Foreign Investment Restrictions on the Stock Returns of Oil Sands Companies

On December 7, 2012 the Government of Canada released a policy statement and revised the guidelines for investments by State-Owned Enterprises in the Canadian oil sands. This policy statement was in response to the proposed purchase of Nexen by the Chinese SOE, CNOOC. According to the new guidelines, foreign investors must convince the Minister of Industry that a particular investment is likely to be of net benefit to Canada and those investments by foreign SOEs to acquire controlling interests in a Canadian oil sands company will be found to be of net benefit on an exceptional basis only. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of this announced policy change on the stock returns of firms operating in the oil sands. We employ an event study analysis to examine the impact of the policy change on the oil sands share price return after the announcement. We find that the announced changes to foreign investment in the oil sands significantly reduced stock returns in that industry and had a much larger negative impact on smaller oil sands companies (the juniors).

The Impact of Foreign Investment Restrictions on the Stock Returns of Oil Sands Companies

On December 7, 2012 the Government of Canada released a policy statement and revised the guidelines for investments by State-Owned Enterprises in the Canadian oil sands. This policy statement was in response to the proposed purchase of Nexen by the Chinese SOE, CNOOC. According to the new guidelines, foreign investors must convince the Minister of Industry that a particular investment is likely to be of net benefit to Canada and those investments by foreign SOEs to acquire controlling interests in a Canadian oil sands company will be found to be of net benefit on an exceptional basis only. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of this announced policy change on the stock returns of firms operating in the oil sands. We employ an event study analysis to examine the impact of the policy change on the oil sands share price return after the announcement. We find that the announced changes to foreign investment in the oil sands significantly reduced stock returns in that industry and had a much larger negative impact on smaller oil sands companies (the juniors).

The Impact of Foreign Investment Restrictions on the Stock Returns of Oil Sands Companies

The Impact of Foreign Investment Restrictions on the Stock Returns of Oil Sands Companies

On December 7, 2012 the Government of Canada released a policy statement and revised the guidelines for investments by State-Owned Enterprises in the Canadian oil sands. This policy statement was in response to the proposed purchase of Nexen by the Chinese SOE, CNOOC. According to the new guidelines, foreign investors must convince the Minister of Industry that a particular investment is likely to be of net benefit to Canada and those investments by foreign SOEs to acquire controlling interests in a Canadian oil sands company will be found to be of net benefit on an exceptional basis only. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of this announced policy change on the stock returns of firms operating in the oil sands. We employ an event study analysis to examine the impact of the policy change on the oil sands share price return after the announcement. We find that the announced changes to foreign investment in the oil sands significantly reduced stock returns in that industry and had a much larger negative impact on smaller oil sands companies (the juniors).

The Impact of Foreign Investment Restrictions on the Stock Returns of Oil Sands Companies

On December 7, 2012 the Government of Canada released a policy statement and revised the guidelines for investments by State-Owned Enterprises in the Canadian oil sands. This policy statement was in response to the proposed purchase of Nexen by the Chinese SOE, CNOOC. According to the new guidelines, foreign investors must convince the Minister of Industry that a particular investment is likely to be of net benefit to Canada and those investments by foreign SOEs to acquire controlling interests in a Canadian oil sands company will be found to be of net benefit on an exceptional basis only. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of this announced policy change on the stock returns of firms operating in the oil sands. We employ an event study analysis to examine the impact of the policy change on the oil sands share price return after the announcement. We find that the announced changes to foreign investment in the oil sands significantly reduced stock returns in that industry and had a much larger negative impact on smaller oil sands companies (the juniors).

The Social Rate of Return to Investing in Character: An Economic Evaluation of Alberta's Immigrant Access Fund Small Loan Program

Truth Telling as Justification for Selfish Action

In this paper, we examine how interrogators can get potential sources to provide information which entails defecting from their group. In our experiment, subjects are faced with an interrogator either using coercive techniques or offering rewards. We argue that coercion and reward affect individuals who are “conditional defectors” differently. These individuals will defect only when they can justify that selfish action as either fair or truth telling. For subjects who possess the information the interrogator desires, these conditional defectors will provide that information in both treatments because they are simply telling the truth. For ignorant subjects, conditional defectors provide bad information under coercion because honestly stating ignorance leads to unequal outcomes. In the reward treatment, truthfully saying “I don’t know” leads to a more equal outcome. This means that interrogators receive more information under coercion, but that information is of lower quality